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VIII
THE CAUSE OF ACTION AND RES JUDICATA

Is the doctrine of res judieata a part of the substantive law,
or procedural law? In those cases where it is based on merger,
it is apparent that it is a rule of substantive law; the old legal
44
right is gone and a new one in the form of judgment is created.
The first involved a right to damages, to the restoration of property, etc.; the right now is to the performance of a judgment to
pay damages, etc. But suppose that the law of Washington is
that if a defendant fails to set up a counterclaim permitted
under the code, he is barred from prosecuting his claim in a
subsequent suit.45 Would he also be barred in Oregon regardless of the Oregon law on res judicata? The answer is not free
from doubt, but it is submitted that again the rights of the
parties have been determined by the law of Washington, and
that res judicata is substantive and not procedural law.
It involves again, however, an inquiry into what is a cause of
action. The rule was that an adjudication on the merits barred
* Continued from the January number.

** See biographical note, p. 380.
The cases are contrary where a foreign judgment is concerned. See
Note (1903) 94 Am. St. Rep. 546. Dean Goodrich explains them on the
ground that they are based upon the theory that a foreign judgment was
not a debt of record. The result under the "full faith and credit clause" is
that merger is a rule of substantive law. See Goodrich, op. cit. supra,note
5, at 474 seq.
45 See Holman v, Tjosevig, 136 Wash. 261, 239 Pac. 545 (1925) and
Note (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 658 for such a decision.
44
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a second suit on the same "cause of action" between the same
parties, or their privies. It is submitted that again "cause of
action" meant "specific substantive right" as a matter of substantive law.
The confusion arises out of the development of the doctrine of
res judicata. The rule no longer is (if in truth it were ever so
simple) that the "same cause of action" is .barred, although it
was not adjudicated. 4 6 The amendment, joinder, counterclaim,
and fusion provisions of the code have wrought havoc with the
old results. The rule now is that the same cause of action and
any others that might have been adjudicated are barred. 47 If
a party might have amended; 48 might have joined;4 9 might have
answered by setting up a counterclaim ;50 might have "fused" ;51

he is now barred by the new doctrine of res judicata. It takes
no new definition of the code "cause of action" to meet that situation. 52 Admittedly what is adjudicated is not the existence of
46 "If the second action is upon the same claim or demand as that in
which the judgment pleaded was rendered, the judgment is an absolute bar
not only to what was decided, but of what might have been decided," per
McKenna, J., in Bates v. Bodie, 245 U. S. 520, 526, 38 Sup. Ct. 182, 184
(1918).
47 Bates v. Bodie, supra note 46. As usual the results have not been
uniform, of course, but quite clearly the tendency has been to follow the
"might have been" doctrine to its logical conclusion. See Holman v.
Tjosevig, supra note 45; also, Fairview-Chase Corp. v. Scharf, 225 App.
Div. 232, 232 N. Y. Supp. 530 (1st Dept. 1929), commented on (1929) 42
Hare. L. Rev. 964, and Gust v. Edwards Co., 129 Ore. "409, 274 Pac. 919
(1929).
48 See Dodson v. Southern Ry. Co., 137 Ga. 583, 73 S. E. 834 (1912).
For a collection of the cases see Note (1921) 13 A. L. R. 1104 et seq. The
older cases hold, of course, that a ruling on demurrer is not res judicata;
but the tendency clearly is to say that because the plaintiff might have
amended, he is barred in a subsequent suit. See Woodward v. Outland, 37
F. (2d) 87 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
49 See Royal Ins. v. Stewart, 190 Ind. 444, 129 N. E. 853 (1921)Because the plaintiff might have joined an equitable action to reform an
insurance policy with a legal action to recover upon the policy as reformed,
an action to reform was held to be barred by a prior legal action to recover
on the policy "as was." Also, King v. C. M. & St. P. R. Co., 80 Minn. 83,
82 N. W. 1113 (1900). Cf. Cook v. Conners, 215 N. Y. 175, 109 N. E. 78
(1915).
50 See the cases and notes cited in note 47, supra.
51 Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135 (1901). See comments on
this case in (1925) 34 Yale L. J. 537, 541, 648, 883.
52 Again Dean Clark thinks that it does; see Clark, op. cit. supra note
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the specific substantive right (or its non-existence). determined
in the former proceedings; it is that plus others which "might
53
have been."
It is unnecessary, therefore, to create a code cause of action
to take care of those cases. And it is submitted that no good can
result from such an attempt.
The inherent difficulty with the view that "cause of action"
must be re-defined to mean all of the facts finally involved in any
proceeding is that after all there is an attempt to change the
substantive law through the laws of pleading. The quarrel, in
the final analysis, is with our theories of specific substantive
rights. It might lessen the problems of pleading if we had such
a thing as a "code cause of action" (although that may well be
doubted, for it begs the question and gives always a result and
no rule), but we have no "code substantive rights." Pleading
and procedure necessarily and inevitably deal with existing
rights and duties and it is confusing, to say the least, to attempt
to "de-classify" legal rights to fit an ideal system of procedure.
Despite the many expressions of dissatisfaction with the
courts' administration of the code of procedure it may be well
to urge that, on the whole, and after all, the result has been in
keeping with its language and purpose. The courts, if they have
been literal, merely accepted the legislature at its word when it
said that it was amending the laws of pleading and practice.
The code furnishes no evidence of an intention to amend the
substantive law; its sole intentions, as expressed by it, was to
prescribe new rules for judicial proceedings. It may appear
quite certain now that there are some reforms in procedure
36, 322, 323. The "cause of action" here is "a group of operative facts
giving rise to one or more rights of action."
53 It is suggested that the cases here were originally talking about the
so-called splitting of a cause of action; that all they meant when they said
that what "might have been" adjudicated was adjudicated, was that the
balance or remnant of a single cause of action could not be the basis of
recovery in a subsequent suit. The courts have, however, seized upon the
language of the cases, and are now prone to administer the "might have
been" doctrine quite literally. The result is, of course, that under the
present statutes on amendment, joinder, counterclaim, and fusion of law
and equity it operates to bar not only part of one cause of action, but two
or more causes of action. It is submitted that such an extension of the
doctrine is justified; that the policy which is the basis of res judicaft
includes these new situations, and that a party ought to be required to
dispose of all of his litigations as expeditiously as the present procedure
permits. Permission thus becomes a command.
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which cannot be accomplished without a change in the substantive law and our theories concerning it. Those who would be
most vehement in their denunciation of the common law system
of changing the substantive law by fictions apparently are quite
willing to revert to that procedure today.
The present writer is free to admit that there are a number
of situations where our procedure can be improved, but it is
believed that we ought to approach the problem with a true
understanding of the distinctions between substantive and procedural law; and if it is necessary to change the substantive law
to fit a better system of procedure, that we ought to go about
the task directly, and with some apprehension as to its possible
consequences.
If, for example, we are to call a right to damages to person
and a right to damages to property but one right, or cause of
action, because they arose out of the same automobile accident,
what are we going to do if, as in some states, the burden of
proof as to contributory negligence is on the defendant in the
first instance and on the plaintiff in the second instance? What
are we to do with the distinctions in the statute of limitations;
the distinctions as to transferability.ma Or if a right to damages
for breach of contract for the carriage of goods by a common
carrier and a right to damages for negligent injury to the goods
are after all to be one cause of action because they arose out of
the same transaction, will the plaintiff recover the measure of
damages prescribed by the law of contracts, or that prescribed
by the law of torts? Unless we allow the plaintiff to say which
it shall be (as we do today), do we not have to legislate as to
the measure of damages for this new hybrid right? When we
go about to re-arrange the substantive law to fit a new procedure, have we not cut out for ourselves an almost impossible
task?
It would seem that it would be.better to make some necessary
amendments in the law of procedure and in general to stick to
our present theories as to the distinctions between substantive
rights.
53a The problem is very aptly put, and the cases collected, in the recent
case of Clancey v. McBride, 169 N. E. 729 (Ill. 1930), and note, 25 111.
L. R. 219.
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Ix
THE JOINDER AND COUNTERCLAIM STATUTES

There remains the consideration of the "cause of action" involved in the joinder and counterclaim statutes, and its relation
to the other provisions of those statutes. For the reasons, heretofore advanced it is submitted again that the code "cause of
action" here can only mean "specific substantive right" as determined by the substantive law.
The real difficulty is in determining when a "cause of action"
"arises out of" the "same contract or transaction" or is "connected with the subject of the action." The authorities are little,
if any, help, because confessedly they have found no rule at all,
or at best one which is indefinite in the extreme.54 It is, of
course, no real objection, of itself, that a rule is indefinite; it
may be that the situation will not yield to a definite and easily
workable rule. If so, a rule based on "substantial connections,"
"reasonable use," or other indefinite standards must be accepted
and employed as well as may be. It is submitted here, however,
that there is a definite, easily workable rule which results from
a very proper, and indeed the only proper, interpretation of the
language of the code.
The trouble has arisen out of misapprehensions of what were
a "cause of action" and "the subject of the action" and out of
an improper interpretation of "the same transaction," "arising
out of," and "connected with."
Too, there has been a tendency to beg the question and say
that "transaction" includes a course of dealings between the
54 "This statutory provision of law regulating practice, which has been
in force more than sixty years, has frequently been the subject of judicial
construction. Thus far, however, no rule has been laid down in its construction by which it can readily be decided in all cases whether- or not a
given counterclaim is properly interposed and as might naturally be expected it would be difficult to harmonize all of the decisions on that point."
Laughlin, J., in Adams v. Schwartz, 137 App. Div. 230, 235, 122 N. Y. Supp.
41, 45 (1st Dept. 1910). "Courts and text-writers have been busy for more
than a half century drafting and re-drafting definitions of the words
'transaction' and 'subject of the action' as new cases have presented themselves, but, on the whole, it may well be doubted whether the discussions
have resulted in clarity of thought." Winslow, C. J., in McArthur V.
Moffett, 143 Wis. 564, 565, 128 N. W. 445 (1910).
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parties of indefinite limits, although the code in the counterclaim
provision specifically limits the "transaction" to that which is
"the foundation" of the plaintiff's claim.
A. The Transaction
The word "transaction" appears in both the joinder and the
counterclaim statutes, but in different context. The joinder
statute is that the causes of action must "arise out of the same
transaction or transactions connected with the subject of the action"; the counterclaim statute is that the cause of action must
arise out of the "transactions set forth in the complaint, as the
foundation of the plaintiff's claim."
The struggle for a definition has been as severe as the one
over the "cause of action." Professor Pomeroy says:
"In order that causes of action may arise out of a transaction,
there must therefore be a negotiation, or a proceeding, or a conduct of business, between the parties, of such a nature that it
produces, as necessary results, two or more different primary
rights in favor of the plaintiff, and wrongs done by the defendant which are violations of such rights." 55
"It (transaction) must, therefore, be something-that combination of acts and events, circumstances and defaults-which,
viewed in one aspect, results in the plaintiff's right of action and,
view in another aspect, results in the defendant's right of
action." 56
Judge Bliss says: "The term 'transaction' is all embracing, and
if a case shall arise in which the defendant is liable to the
plaintiff for a wrong based upon the matter-which is the foundation of the action, whether it be a contract, or tort, or anything
else, such liability is covered by the provision under consid57
eration."
Judge Phillips says: "The term 'transaction' has no technical
meaning, and was probably used in the codes for that reason.
When the operative facts of one transaction create two or more
primary rights in one party to the transaction, and also show
violations thereof by the other party, then two or more rights
58
of action have arisen out of such transaction."
Dean Clark says: "This class has been the subject of the
55 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 1, at 559.
56 Ibid., 1056.
57 Bliss, op. cit. supra note 34, at 565.
58 Phillips, op. cit. supra note 33, at 176.
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most diverse interpretation by the courts. .
.
A much
sounder method of interpretation would seem to be frankly to
recognize the vague extent of the rule and to apply it broadly
to carry out what all procedural rules are designed to accomplish, namely, convenience and efficiency in trials. This would
result in much discretion in the trial court. 59 . . . Conceivably, 'transaction' might include all those facts which a layman
would naturally associate with, or consider as being a part of
the affair, altercation, or course of dealings between the

parties."60

It seems to be agreed that "transaction" can only refer to the
facts involved. This in truth appears quite plain. But if we
say that it includes the facts which comprise the bases of all of
the plaintiff's claims joined in one action, and all of those which
form the bases of the defendants' answers on counterclaims, the
proper answer to the problem and the answer in fact are coextensive. We have begged the question; we have no means of
knowing how the result was reached, and consequently we have
no rule for other cases in the future.
As to the counterclaim statute there is involved in this result
also a plain violation of the language of the code. It provides
that the defendant's cause of action must be one "arising out
of the contract or transactions, set forth in the complaint as
the foundation of the plaintiff's claim." What else can "transactions set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim" mean than the factual situation alleged in the complaint? The plaintiff must plead the facts constituting his
cause of action; no more and no less. He has "set forth" nothing else in his complaint than the facts upon which his substantive right is based. It is submitted that it is too clear for argument that "transaction" means only the specific factual situation
alleged in the complaint. Too, such an interpretation does away
with the requirement that the cause of action "arise out of" certain transactions. If the "cause of action" and the "transaction" are identical, the one can in no sense "arise out of" the
other. The only fair interpretation of the language is that there
is only a partial identity between the facts set out in the complaint and the facts out of which the defendant's counter-cause
of action arises.
59 Clark, op. cit. supra note 36, at 308-311.
60 Ibid., at 451-452.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

It is submitted, too, that the joinder statute must be construed
to reach the same result. The legislature here is entitled to the
presumption that it was laying down a rule of pleading and not
a result. If we say that "same transaction" means a factual
situation covered by all of the causes of action joined, then the
totality of the facts involved are the "same transaction." Any
plaintiff could join any number of dissimilar and unconnected
factual situations and they become ipso facto the "same transaction." The other provisions of the code become meaningless, because the transaction clause allows an unlimited joinder.
It seems only fair and quite proper to say that the requirement that the cause of action "arise out of the same transaction"
means that it arises out of a transaction (factual situation)
which gives rise to one of the specific causes of action involved.
Dean Clark argues that it must be read as follows: "arising out
of facts"; which, it is submitted, again disposes of all the problems, but destroys the balance of the code provisions on joinder
of actions, for it supersedes them all and allows an unlimited
joinder. But certainly no such result was intended.
The truth is that the code here is talking about the joinder
of actions (judicial proceedings) based on causes of action arising out of the same transaction. What the plaintiff directly
joins is not causes of actions, but proceedings seeking judicial
recognition of causes of action, which includes indirectly, of
course, the joining of complaints and the causes of action
asserted therein. The code here has as a background the established practice that fundamentally a judicial proceeding was between one plaintiff and one defendant involving a single cause
,of action. The provisions of the code as to joinder are really
for the purpose of allowing additions to that single proceeding.
The proceeding is after all the one represented by the first paragraph of the complaint. Therefore, a plaintiff is here permitted
to "unite to" or "join to" or "add to" this proceeding further
proceedings involving additional causes of action if they "arise
out of the same transaction" set forth in the first paragraph of
the complaint. We then have something to measure by; something to "unite to" or "join to."
The force of this argument is augmented by the later provision of the joinder statute that the causes of actions joined
must "affect all of the parties to the action." "The action" must
be specific (and not the result of the joinder statute), and can
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only refer to the judicial proceedings represented by the first
paragraph of the complaint.
"The same transaction" in the joinder statute and "transactions set forth in the complaint, as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim" in the counterclaim statute mean the same thing:
they mean the factual situation set out in the complaint. (In
the joinder statute it is the first paragraph of the complaint; in
the counterclaim statute it may, of course, be any paragraph of
the complaint.)
B. The Subject of the Action
The "factual situation" which constitutes the "transaction"
also necessarily forms part of "the subject of the action." As
we have seen heretofore, the "action" means "judicial proceeding" and has no relation to the "cause of action." The judicial
proceeding (or action) is for the purpose of determining
whether in law and fact the plaintiff has a substantive right to
be changed into the form of a judgment. There is, therefore,
an inquiry or investigation by the court into the law and the
facts. Narrowly speaking the subject of the judicial proceeding
is only the inquiry or investigation, but broadly speaking the
subject of the judicial proceeding is the inquiry or investigation
into the law and the facts. It is the latter sense in which it is
used in the code. The New Century Dictionary defines it as
"something which forms a matter of investigation." It is not
the investigation, but the matter of the investigation; that is,
here the existence in law and fact of this asserted substantive
right. The "factual situation" asserted by the allegations in the
complaint is properly then a part of "the subject of the action."
Again the authorities have rather assumed this; that is, that
in some way the facts again were involved. But here also they
have in most instances begged the question and said that the
facts are all the facts finally involved in the actions the code
allowed to be joined, or set up as the bases of counterclaims.
Again, that is the result, and not the rule. We have no means
of knowing how that result is to be reached in other cases.
Professor Pomeroy's opinion was that the subject of the
action was the asserted right, rather than the controversy or
possible controversy concerning it.61
61 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 1, 1058. Mr. Chief Justici Winslow in
the case of McArthur v. Moffett, supra note 54, comes to the conclusion
that the subject of the action is not the plaintiff's "primary right," but it
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Judge Bliss's opinion was that, "The subject of the action is
not the wrong which gives the plaintiff the right to ask the
interposition of the court, nor is it that which the court is asked
to do for him, but it must be the matter or thing, differing both
from the wrong and the relief, in regard to which the controversy has arisen, concerning which the wrong has been done;
and this is, ordinarily, the property, or the contract and its
subject-matter or other thing involved in the dispute." 62
Judge Phillips' conclusion was to much the same effect.0 3
Professor McCaskill's opinion is that it is the totality of the
facts which the code allows to be tried at the same time. He
says: "A prospective look is taken at a suit properly constituted, and the subject matter of that suit is taken to be the
'subject of action' in which the parties have an interest.
It is the totality of operative facts which, determined by the
principles of administrative convenience, can be dealt with in
one suit. Within this larger mass the smaller units, the causes
of action, may be found." 6 4
This does not differ materially from Dean Clark's view. He
says: "Similarly the phrase 'connected with the subject of the
action' might plausibly be understood to allow, as a counterclaim, any cause of action which, although not a part of the
plaintiff's transaction, would, upon trial, raise issues which are
so like those raised by the complaint that justice and expediency
require that they should be tried together." 5
Varying support for all of these views can doubtless be found
in the cases, but it is submitted that there is involved in each
a misunderstanding as to the subject of the action; it is only
an investigation into the law and the facts involved in the
asserted right.
C. Arising out of
There are two very apparent errors in the usual interpretation o-f this phrase. The first is the one which says "arising out
of" must mean "springing up out of." The second is that it is
"facts" which "arise," rather than a "cause of action."
is the plaintiff's "main primary right." It seems apparent that this only
adds a confusion to what already is a sufficient confusion.
62 Bliss, op. cit. supra note 34, at 214.
63 Phillips, op. cit. supra note 33, at 229.

64 McCaskill, op. cit. supra note 37, at 647.
65 Clark, op. cit. supra note 36, at 453-455.
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Particularly in connection with the counterclaim statute,
"arising out of" has been defined as "springing up out of." The
result is that it depends on which party sues first as to whether
or not a counterclaim is proper. That is, suppose A trespasses
on B's real estate and as a result B commits an assault and battery on A. A sues B for the assault and battery. B cannot file
an answer based on the trespass under this clause, because the
factual situation forming the basis of B's cause of action precedes in point of time the facts forming the basis of A's cause
of action. The courts say "arising out of" means "springing up
out of," and forward, and not backward. 66
The proper antonym is "subsiding out of." Therefore, if the
legislature had wished to allow a counterclaim upon facts which
preceded in point of time the facts involved in the plaintiff's
claim, it would have allowed a counterclaim on a cause of action
"subsiding out of the same transaction." That does not make
much sense, and credits the legislature with even less than the
usual amount of attributed intelligence.
This interpretation is not of any great damage in those states
where the code also contains the "subject of the action" clause.0 7
But it is fundamentally unsound. "Arise" has more than one
connotation. "Arise-1. To come up from a lower to a higher
position; to ascend. 2. To spring up; to come into action, being,
or notice; to become operative, sensible, or visible. 3. To proceed; issue; spring." 68
"Arising out of" here means "coming into being"; not by
reason of any active force on its part, which causes it to "spring
up," but by operation of law. And it is not facts which "come
into being," but a "cause of action," that is, a substantive
right.69 Here again we are dealing with a rule of pleading: the
66 See, e. g., Adams v. Schwartz, supra note 54, and McCargarV. Wiley,

112 Ore. 215, 229 Pac. 665 (1924).
37

See Clark, op. cit. supra note 36, at 463:

"'Contract,' 'transaction,'

and 'subject of the action'-each in succession permits a broader counterclaim than the next preceding term."
68 Webster's New International Dictionary. The New Century Dietionary defines it as follows: "To rise up; to get up; to move upward;
mount or ascend; to come into view, being or action; appear; begin;
originate; spring up."
60 This is the natural use of the phrase. For instance, in the Seaboard
Air Line Ry. v. Koennecke, 239 U. S. 352, 354, 36 Sup. Ct. 126, 127 (1915),

the question being whether the plaintiff's right was created by State or
Federal law, Mr. Justice Holmes said, "The cause of action arose under a
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defendant is to set up in his answer "new matter" (facts) constituting a "cause of action" arising out of the transaction set
forth as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim. It is the "cause
of action" which "comes into being," and not the facts constituting it.
Again the code is quite incapable of any other interpretation.
It says, "The counterclaim (to be set up in the answer) must be,
a cause of action arising out of the contract, or transaction, set
forth in the complaint, as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim."
In the same way a plaintiff may join several complaints or
"causes of action" (and not "facts") coming into being out of" a
same transaction.
Literally construed the code here means nothing. A cause of
action cannot "arise out of" or "come into being of" a
contract. (Contract here means contract in fact, and not the legal
obligations imposed by the law as a result of the contract, because we are, again, dealing with a rule of pleading.) It is a contract in fact and a breach or threatened breach in fact which
bring into being a cause of action. To mean anything, then, the
code must read (and it has so been interpreted whenever it has
been given any effect here) "a cause of action arising partly out
of the contract set out as the foundation of the plaintiff's claims."
The "foundation" of the plaintiff's claim is the contract in fact
plus the breach (or threatened breach) in fact by the defendant;
it is not solely the contract.
The same is true of the "transaction clause." No cause of
action can arise out of the "transaction (factual situation) set
forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim"
except the plaintiff's cause of action, 70 unless, of course, the
plaintiff has violated the rules of pleading and made allegations
which are not necessary, and which in fact show a right in favor
of the defendant. The plaintiff necessarily only alleges the facts
which show a violation of a duty owing from the defendant to
the plaintiff. The facts if properly pleaded could not show a violation of a duty owing from the plaintiff to the defendant, unless
different law by the amendment, but the facts constituting the tort were the
same, whichever law gave them that effect."
70 The same thing is true as to the joinder statute. Properly pleaded,
the first paragraph of complaint would be based upon the only cause of
action which could "come into being" out of one (the same) transaction.
The word "partly" (or its equivalent) must again be added.
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the plaintiff is entirely mistaken as to his cause of action, or
includes in his complaint considerable surplusage.
So to mean anything at all the counterclaim provision here
must read (and has been so read in truth whenever it has been
given any efficacy at all) : "A cause of action arising partly out
of the transaction set out as the foundation of the plaintiff's
claims," and the joinder provision here must read, "Causes of
action arising partly out of the same transaction" (the transaction set out in the first paragraph of complaint).
It is only necessary that the factual situation which is the
basis of the plaintiff's first paragraph of complaint and the factual situations alleged in the other paragraphs of complaint, or
the factual situations alleged in an answer setting up a counterclaim, have some facts in common. If they have facts in common, the causes of action involved "come into being" (partly)
out of the same factual situation. This is the only proper interpretation of these code provisions and as pointed out above it is
the interpretation which the courts have unconsciously placed
upon it.
How many facts in common must there be? The cases have
given varying answers, but for the most part have required some
more or less substantial connections in fact. Dean Clark says
the test should be as to whether or not there are enough facts
in common conveniently to try the various actions together. 71
One is free to make his own rule, because the code here
clearly is incomplete, and to mean anything at all must be added
to. The policy involved then becomes material, and "policy" apparently forms the basis of the rules adopted by the courts and
the text-writers. Here again it is easy to take issue with them.
One purpose of the counterclaim statute is to give the defendant
the privilege of effectually destroying his liability to the plaintiff by the assertion and proof of a counter-liability. That is, the
code extends the old doctrine of "recoupment," and allows as a
"defense" this counter-liability; and, also, of course, it allows recovery of any excess. To the defendant it is a most important
right or privilege, and of more practical importance than the advantage to be gained from the saving of time and money in trying two separate actions. In the same way the joinder statute
is of benefit to a plaintiff; it helps him meet a counter-liability
71

Supra note 65.
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which the defendant may set up. The rights of the parties here
ought to be reciprocal.
Another purpose is to dispose of law suits having some common foundation in fact at the same trial, with a consequent saving of time and money. The courts and the text-writers place
the emphasis on the latter policy quite exclusively; they look to
the convenience in the trial of the action as the decisive test.
The emphasis ought to be placed on the other. The parties ought
to be allowed the widest latitude in "recoupment" of liabilities.
Questions of convenience in trial can well be taken care of by
the court allowing separate trials whenever expedient. And here
there is a conclusive argument against the "convenience" doctrine. That is, Dean Clark and others say that the test is
whether or not the actions can be conveniently tried together.
This necessarily nullifies the common provisions of the code that
"when several causes of action are united, belonging to any of
the foregoing classes, the court may order separate trials for
the furtherance of justice," and that "the court, in its discretion, may order one or more issues to be separately tried prior
to any trial of the other issues in the case." The code, therefore,
specifically allows a joinder or answer on a counter-claim, even
although the result be inconvenience of trial; the test, then cannot be convenience of trial. It would quite inevitably forbid the
joinder of legal and equitable actions and an answer on a counterclaim where that difference arose.
If the right of "recoupment" is to be extended, the statute
should be given the broadest possible interpretation. The test
here should be, then, is there a common fact? That can be determined by the application of the "but for" or cause in fact test
with which the courts are already familiar in the field of torts.
That is, "but for" one fact common to the factual situations,
forming the bases of the various paragraphs of complaint and
counterclaims, would these asserted rights have come into being?
Take, for example, the following case: A is fixing his tire in
the roadway; B attempts to pass in his automobile and negligently hits A, causing injuries to his person; he stops and backs
up to see what has happened and negligently backs into A's car,
knocking it into a ditch, and injuring the car. There is a child,
C, in A's car, so far uninjured; B attempts to remove C from
the car and negligently injures C. A claims to be the father of C,
and B later pays to A $1000 in settlement of his cause of action
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for injuries to his child, but B refuses to settle the other claims.
A sues and joins actions for his personal injuries and injury to
the automobile; B files an answer setting up a cause of action
based on the fraudulent representations as to settlement for
$1000, that is, that C in fact was not A's child. Is the joinder
proper? Is the answer proper? The parties have no means of
knowing in advance; it depends on whether there are substantial connections or there is sufficient convenience, accordingly as
the Supreme Court may finally decide (forgetting the "inconvenience" to B of possibly being forced to pay A's judgments,
and being unable to collect one he may obtain against A in another suit).
However, applying the "but for" test, the joinder and the
answer are both proper. "But for" B's hitting A, he would not
have hit the automobile; he would not have injured C and he
would not have made the settlement. 72
It is to be noted that under such a rule it makes no difference
which party sues first. It is the "cause of action" which must
"come into being out of" a common (in part) factual situation,
and not the facts which must "come into being." There must
only be a causal connection in fact. That exists no matter which
cause of action is sued on first. And it would make no difference
that a considerable time had transpired between the happening
72 It is necessary again to take issue with Dean Clark. He says that
one must deal here with the "operative" or "material" facts; op. cit. supra
note 36, at 451-452. An "operative fact" is after all only an inference of
fact or a cumulative fact from so-called evidentiary facts. For example, A
alleges that B killed C. That is, so it is said, an allegation of an "ultimate"
or "operative" fact. What is meant is that B hit C over the head with a
club, and C died as a result. It is to a certain extent true that the
"operative fact" is composed of the evidentiary facts, and that one would
get the same result under the "but for" test. The objection is that it adds
needless confusion in any event, and really stands in the way of a solution
of the problem in those actions where under the law of pleading an allegation of a so-called conclusion of law passes for an allegation of an operative
fact. For example, it is settled that "negligently" and "wrongfully converted" are "operative facts." In truth they are not facts at all, for whenever one is dealing with what "should or should not have happened"
instead of "what did happen" he is dealing with law, and not fact. It is
impossible to find any connection in fact between rules of law. (For the
same reason "legal cause" as a test is unworkable.)
If we say the connection must be between "material" facts it might be
possible to reach the same result in most cases, but again there is only
added an unnecessary confusion.
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of the two events, if one was in truth the cause in fact of the
other.7 3
D. Connected with the Subject of the Action
1. THE JOINDER STATUTE

The joinder provision in the code is that the plaintiff "may
unite in the same complaint (but in separate paragraphs, that is,
separately stated) two or more causes of action,-where they
are brought to recover-upon claims arising out of transactions connected with the subject of the action." As we have
seen, the plaintiff really unites actions having as their bases the
statements of fact upon which the separate substantive rights
are predicated. That is, it must be remembered that the code
here is dealing with the law of procedure; it is the action which
is "brought," and not the "cause of action." The code here is
properly paraphrased to read: "The plaintiff may unite in the
same complaint proceedings upon two or more causes of action,
-where the proceedings are brought to recover upon, etc."
"Claims" here obviously mean what the code in other places
calls "causes of action."
This section then becomes quite clear; one may unite complaints on causes of action which came into being7 4 out of factual
situations connected with the subject of the action. The subject
of the action includes among other things the factual situation
in the first paragraph of the complaint. It includes other things
as well, but it is impossible to have any connection between them
and the similar things in the other paragraphs of the complaint.
Courts have been prone to call the "subject of the action" the
land or the chattel "out of which" the "primary rights" arose.
But as pointed out in the early portion of this article, the land or
73 For example, in Rothschild v. Whitman, 132 N. Y. 472, 30 N. E. 858
(1892), a counterclaim was not permitted for the reason (among others)
that an act in January and one in September were too remotely connected.
Properly, however, the time element has little to do with cause in fact;
one might light a fuse today which would explode a bomb tomorrow, or a
year later, but the lighting of the fuse is as much the cause in fact of the
explosion in the one case as it is in the other. See Western U. T. Co. v.
Preston, 254 Fed. 229 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918) and Smith, Legal Cause In
Actions of Tort (1911), 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103, 106.
74 "Arising out of" here means the same as it does in the counterclaim
statute.
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the chattel, even in proceedings in rem, is not involved in the
proceedings; only the plaintiff's and defendant's rights and
duties in connection with those material things are involved.
There can be no connection between these substantive rights
which may arise out of acts in regard to the same material thing;
the only connection possible is one which might exist between
the facts which are involved in the creation of those rights.
For the purposes of these statutes then the only "subject of
the action" involved is the factual situation. Under the joinder
statute then one may unite actions on substantive rights which
came into being out of factual situations connected with the factual situation set out in the first paragraph of the complaint. 75
The courts and most of the text-writers have quite consistently reached this result; that is, it is a connection in fact which
must exist. But they seem to require again that there must be
a substantial or direct connection. 76 That, however, is unwarranted; the code does not say "substantial" or "direct" connection; it says only that there must be a connection in fact. Again,
the proper test is, "but for" some fact in the first paragraph
would we have the factual situations which form the bases of
the other paragraphs of complaint? The rule is easy to apply
and is in strict accord with the very language of the code. And
it reaches a desirable result. It gives again an almost unlimited
"recoupment," and permits a joinder (or answer) in all cases
where the present interpretations do, and in many others where
75 One can only again properly look at the joinder as depending on the
first paragraph of complaint. That is, the subject of the action must be
specific, and is determined by what the plaintiff sets out in his first paragraph of complaint. Again, if the subject of the action includes anything
which the plaintiff does join, there is the absurdity that this provision, too,
supersedes all of the other provisions on the joinder of actions. If one
says that the subject of the action is to be determined by what the courts
think may conveniently be joined, the provision that the plaintiff may join
other actions "connected with" that subject of the action is disregarded and
is given no effect. Those supposed solutions give a result, but no rule,
and are a violation of the words "connected with" and the subsequent provision to the effect that, if the actions joined cannot be conveniently tried
together, there may be separate trials ordered.
713 "In respect to the phrase connected with the subject of the action,
one rule may be regarded as settled by the decisions, and it is recommended
by its good sense and its convenience in practice. The connection must be
immediate and direct. A remote, uncertain, partial connection is not
enough to satisfy the requirements of the statute." Pomeroy, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 1059.
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they do not. It is admitted by most authorities that an extension
of the present rules on joinder and counterclaim is desirable. 77
The authorities have read into the code here the requirement
that there be a substantial or direct connection in fact. The code,
however, is quite specific to the effect that there need only be
a connection in fact. Obviously the "cause in fact" or "but for"
test solves the problem.
2. THE COUNTERCLAIM STATUTE

The answer of the defendant must contain "a statement of
any new matter (facts) constituting a cause of action connected
78
with the subject of the action."
We are again dealing with the rules of pleading; in fact this
statute allows no doubt on that score, for it provides that the
answer must contain "a statement of any new matter constituting a cause of action connected with the subject of the action." It is the new matter (facts) which go (with a rule of
law) to make up a cause of action which must be connected with
the subject of the action, and not the cause of action which must
be connected. The subject of the sentence is "a statement of any
new matter, etc."; the subject of the sentence is not "a cause of
action."
But again the authorities require some more or less substantial connection. This again is a plain violation of the language
of the code; the only requirement is that there be a connection,
which means and can only mean a causal connection in fact.
Again the proper test ought to be the "but for" test, for the reasons advanced in connection with the similar provision in the
joinder statute.
E. The Contract Clause
The contract clause 79 has caused little difficulty. Upon the
basis of the foregoing discussion it can be paraphrased to read
as follows: "The defendant's answer must contain a statement
of any new facts constituting a substantive right, if the plaintiff's judicial proceeding is based on a substantive right, which
77 See, for example, Clark, op. cit. supra note 36, at 297-298 and 455.
78 "Subject of the action" means identically what it does in the joinder

statute.
79 "In an action on contract, any other cause of action on contract,
existing at the commencement of the action."
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as a matter of substantive law is classified as a contract right,
and if also the (counterclaim) substantive right is classified as
a contract right." It deals with the traditional classifications
of rights.
X
It must be admitted that there is an argument of some little
apparent force against these conclusions. In the counterclaim
statute the "transaction" clause and the "subject of the action"
clause mean the same thing and reach the same result. They are
in the disjunctive and the presumption would ordinarily be that
they were not identical in result; that one added something to
the other; that the latter provision was not mere surplusage.
But that rule of statutory construction is only a rule as to construction and it has its exceptions and limits. In truth, courts
have always felt free to give a fair interpretation to one portion
of a statute although the result be to make the balance of the
statute mere redundancy. 80 Redundancy is not such a rare
phenomenon that it can be said in every case that the legislature
has not perchance employed it. The truth is that redundancy is
a vice peculiarly a part of legal language. It is submitted that
it is quite proper to say here that the legislature and the drafters
of the code said the same thing over in different language, and
that that fact alone is no objection to any proper interpretation
placed upon both phrases involved. 8 '
80 See, for example, Van Dyke v. Cordova Copper Co., 234 U. S. 188,
34 Sup. Ct. 884 (1914); also, Mller v. Union Indemnity Co., 209 App. Div.
455, 458, 204 N. Y. Supp. 730, 733 (4th Dept. 1924): "Our experience has

not shown so careful a use of language in statutes or legal documents as to
allow us to give weight to such an argument. The redundancy and
tautology of legal phraseology is proverbial."
In a somewhat similar situation Mr. Justice Holmes said this: "We
agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what
they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing
laws as saying what they obviously mean." Roschen v. Ward, 279 U. S.
337, 49 Sup. Ct. 336 (1929).
81 It is admitted that there is little, if any, authority for all of the

exact results reached by the present author. It is quite hopeless to find
anything like an adequate rule in, or from, the cases. The author's position is that the rules contended for by him will permit every satisfactory
result so far reached, and that in addition we will have simple, workable
rules, easy of application, and with, desirable results.
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XI
CONCLUSION

It is submitted that the following meaning must be ascribed
to the various terms used in the Code of Civil Procedure:
1. CAUSE OF ACTION: Specific substantive right as a matter
of substantive law ("right" is here used in its broadest sense).
2. CLAIM: Specific substantive right as a matter of substantive law.
3. COUNTERLAIM: Specific substantive right as a matter of
substantive law.
4. ARISING OUT OF: Coming into being out of.
5. TRANSACTIONS: Factual situation.
6. FOUNDATION OF: Factualsituation.
7. CONNECTED WITH: A causal connection in fact with (that
is, "but for" one fact, would the other factual situations have
existed?).
8. SUBJECT OF THE ACTION: Factual situation, involved in
the controversy or possible controversy between the parties as
to the law or the facts, or both.
9. ACTION: Judicial proceedings.
The various code provisions can be paraphrased to read as
follows:
1. The complaint shall contain a plain and concise statement
of the facts, which under a rule of law go to make up (or constitute) a specific substantive right as a matter of substantive
law.
2. A plaintiff may add to his original action, or complaint, one
or more actions, or complaints based on specific substantive
rights which rights came into being partly out of the same factual situation, or whose factual situations have a causal connection in fact with the factual situation set out in the first paragraph of the plaintiff's complaint.
3. The defendant may file an answer containing a statement
of the facts which under a rule of law go to make up (or constitute) a specific substantive right as a matter of substantive law,
and which right came into being partly out of the contract or
factual situation set forth in the complaint as the factual situation of the plaintiff's substantive right, or which facts stated
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in the answer have a causal connection in fact with the factual
situation set out in the complaint.
4 Whether an amended pleading states a new cause of action
depends on whether it states a factual situation which as a
matter of substantive law gives rise to a different substantive
right. (This assumes that the rule on amendments and the
statute of limitations is, or ought to be, as narrow as that set
out at the beginning of this article. As has been urged herein,
the correct rule cannot be expressed in those terms, although
this is the rule in its common form.)
5. Whether a subsequent action is barred by the doctrine of
res judicata dependg on whether or not the inquiry in the first
action was into the same factual situation creating the same
specific substantive right as a matter of substantive law. (This
assumes that the rule of xes judicata is as narrow as stated
above. As has been urged herein, the present rule on res
judicata cannot be expressed in those terms.)

